Game Theory: Who gets to go to the 2026 World Cup? Who actually gets to go to the World Cup? With US President Donald Trump's strict immigration policies, some fans may never make it past the American border. Because while teams qualify on merit, passports don't. Al Jazeera's Samantha Johnson explains. The Masters: Golf's segregated past Are Iran's athletes political pawns?

Game Theory: Could geopolitics impact the business of sport in the Gulf? The Gulf helped transform global sport through billions in investment. But as geopolitical tensions rise is that era of rapid expansion coming to an end? Al Jazeera's Samantha Johnson looks at how geopolitics could impact the business of sport. The Masters: Golf's segregated past Are Iran's athletes political pawns?

In this interview series, we're meeting some of the AAAI/SIGAI Doctoral Consortium participants to find out more about their research. We hear from Xinwei Song about the two main research threads she's worked on so far, plans to expand her investigations, and what inspired her to study AI. Could you start with a quick introduction - where are you studying, and what is the topic of your research? My research primarily focuses on strategic interactions in networked multi-agent systems. Could you give us an overview of the research you've carried out so far during your PhD? My research to date consists of two main threads, which complement each other in exploring strategic interactions from different perspectives.

Feature selection is a classical problem in statistics and machine learning, and it continues to remain an extremely challenging problem especially in the context of unknown non-linear relationships with dependent features. On the other hand, Shapley values are a classic solution concept from cooperative game theory that is widely used for feature attribution in general non-linear models with highly-dependent features. However, Shapley values are not naturally suited for feature selection since they tend to capture both direct effects from each feature to the response and indirect effects through other features. In this paper, we combine the advantages of Shapley values and adapt them to feature selection by proposing \emph{MinShap}, a modification of the Shapley value framework along with a suite of other related algorithms. In particular for MinShap, instead of taking the average marginal contributions over permutations of features, considers the minimum marginal contribution across permutations. We provide a theoretical foundation motivated by the faithfulness assumption in DAG (directed acyclic graphical models), a guarantee for the Type I error of MinShap, and show through numerical simulations and real data experiments that MinShap tends to outperform state-of-the-art feature selection algorithms such as LOCO, GCM and Lasso in terms of both accuracy and stability. We also introduce a suite of algorithms related to MinShap by using the multiple testing/p-value perspective that improves performance in lower-sample settings and provide supporting theoretical guarantees.

Will Gulf states join war? Game Theory: Are Iran's athletes political pawns? Game Theory Are Iran's athletes political pawns? While in Australia, members of Iran's women's football team found themselves at the centre of an international political storm. As several players choose to return home, difficult questions are being raised about athlete safety, agency and Western intervention.

Aggregative games provide a rich abstraction to model strategic multi-agent interactions. We focus on learning local aggregative games, where the payoff of each player is a function of its own action and the aggregate behavior of its neighbors in a connected digraph. We show the existence of a pure strategy epsilon-Nash equilibrium in such games when the payoff functions are convex or sub-modular. We prove an information theoretic lower bound, in a value oracle model, on approximating the structure of the digraph with non-negative monotone sub-modular cost functions on the edge set cardinality. We also introduce gamma-aggregative games that generalize local aggregative games, and admit epsilon-Nash equilibrium that are stable with respect to small changes in some specified graph property. Moreover, we provide estimation algorithms for the game theoretic model that can meaningfully recover the underlying structure and payoff functions from real voting data.

We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function C is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be learned from samples drawn from a distribution, represented as tuples (S, C(S)), for different subsets S of players. We formalize this approach, which we call statistical cost sharing, and consider the computation of the core and the Shapley value. Expanding on the work by Balcan et al, we give precise sample complexity bounds for computing cost shares that satisfy the core property with high probability for any function with a non-empty core. For the Shapley value, which has never been studied in this setting, we show that for submodular cost functions with curvature bounded curvature kappa it can be approximated from samples from the uniform distribution to a sqrt{1 - kappa} factor, and that the bound is tight. We then define statistical analogues of the Shapley axioms, and derive a notion of statistical Shapley value and that these can be approximated arbitrarily well from samples from any distribution and for any function.

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible.

Subjective expected utility theory assumes that decision-makers possess unlimited computational resources to reason about their choices; however, virtually all decisions in everyday life are made under resource constraints---i.e.

Morphology-control co-design concerns the coupled optimization of an agent's body structure and control policy. This problem exhibits a bi-level structure, where the control dynamically adapts to the morphology to maximize performance. Existing methods typically neglect the control's adaptation dynamics by adopting a single-level formulation that treats the control policy as fixed when optimizing morphology. This can lead to inefficient optimization, as morphology updates may be misaligned with control adaptation. In this paper, we revisit the co-design problem from a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the intrinsic coupling between morphology and control as a novel variant of a Stackelberg game. We propose Stackelberg Proximal Policy Optimization (Stackelberg PPO), which explicitly incorporates the control's adaptation dynamics into morphology optimization. By modeling this intrinsic coupling, our method aligns morphology updates with control adaptation, thereby stabilizing training and improving learning efficiency. Experiments across diverse co-design tasks demonstrate that Stackelberg PPO outperforms standard PPO in both stability and final performance, opening the way for dramatically more efficient robotics designs.